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MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL BUSINESS SYSTEMS: 
INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION
Roderick Martin
ABSTRACT
The working paper analyzes the relations between multinational corporations and the Hungarian business 
system.  Within the context of globalization, the paper outlines the strategies and organizational structures 
adopted by multinational corporations.  It concentrates on two sectors which have been major sources of 
employment in Hungary, motor vehicles and electronics.  The paper also analyzes the business system in 
terms of the role of the state, national corporations and the business culture.  The paper views multinational 
involvement in Central and Eastern Europe from an international rather than a regional perspective, identifying 
the ways in which the interests of multinationals and states coincide, and the ways in which they differ. 
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1.  I n t r o du c t i o n
Since the 1980s, globalization has become a common place, researched from a wide range of disciplines 
– history, political science, sociology, geography, management as well as economics (Jones, 2007). 
According to Anthony Giddens, a globalization enthusiast, globalization is ‘the worldwide interconnection 
at the cultural, political and economic level resulting from the elimination of communication and trade 
barriers’, which is leading towards the international ‘convergence of cultural, political and economic 
aspects of life’ (Giddens, 1999).  For Giddens, globalization is here.  Indicators of globalization include 
the increasing ratio of world trade to GDP, growth in international communications, both physically 
by international travel and electronically, through internet communications, international cultural 
convergence.  In the economy, global capital flows, multinationals’ global sourcing and international 
production systems, global markets for standardized products, and international competitive pressures 
have promoted globalization (Kogut and Gittelman, 1998).  This process has been enabled by 
technological change, especially the transformation of information and communications technologies 
(ICTs) through computerization from the late 1970s, a new ‘socio-technological paradigm’ (Dosi, 
1988:224-5), and by increasing standardization of business practice.  Management consultancies 
and accounting firms, committed to ‘international standards’ of corporate governance and financial 
performance, have been a further globalizing influence.
Globalization has affected Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), as other regions.  The region has 
received high levels of international capital investment, from both public and private sector investors. 
Countries in the region have received investment in infrastructure from international financial 
institutions, especially the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
specifically established to facilitate the economic development of the region, the European Union 
and individual national governments.  In Hungary, the EBRD financed  investment in infrastructure 
(telecommunications, roads, railways, Budapest public transport), privatizations, the development of 
small and medium sized enterprises, and financial institutions, including during the 2008-10 financial 
crisis (EBRD, 2010).  By the end of 2009, the FDI stock in Hungary reached EUR 60 billions (ITD, 
Hungary, 2010).  The region has received capital investment from private financial institutions, pension 
funds and investment trusts, and from multinational corporations.  The significance of international 
trade for national economies has increased: for Poland, the ratio between international trade and GDP 
increased from 60.67 in 2000 to 83.94 in 2008, for the Czech Republic from 129.77 to 149.63, and 
for Hungary from 149.79 to 163.32 over the same period.  Comparative figures for the UK and the US 
were 57.10 in 2000 for the UK and 60.97 in 2008, and for the US 25.95 in 2000 and 30.41 in 2008; 
larger countries, with larger domestic markets and higher levels of GDP, naturally showed a lower 
ratio (OECD, 2010).  Multinational investment in production facilities in CEE, especially in motor 
vehicles and electronics, including office equipment and mobile telephones, led to the integration of 
CEE enterprises into international production networks.
Yet a nuanced analysis of globalization is necessary (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Held and 
McGrew, 2007).  The process is uneven, between areas (economy, politics, culture) and within 
specific areas.  Globalization is more dominant in the economy than in politics; political parties 
remain national, sensitive to issues of national sovereignty.  Moreover, the same trends may be 
interpreted in different ways.  For example, international migration results in large ethnic minorities 
in metropolitan countries, who continue to identify with their country of origin as much as, or more 
than, with their country of residence, and maintain national cultural identities: is this an indication of 
globalization?  In industrial relations, Katz and Darbishire speak of ‘converging divergences’ (2000), 
similar patterns of differentiation amongst national systems.  This paper distinguishes between three 
stages of economic internationalization, with globalization as the most fully developed form.  The 
first stage is internationalization through the logic of exchange, with expansion in international trade. 
The second stage is internationalization through the logic of production, with integration of value 
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chains and production systems across national boundaries.  The third stage is globalization, with 
corporate strategies determined independently of national considerations (Gordon, 1996).  Changes 
in the level of international trade provide evidence to support theories of globalization according 
to the logic of exchange, with massive expansion in the international transfer of goods and services 
since the 1980s.  There is also considerable evidence to support the globalization of production (e.g., 
Jones, 2005).  There is only limited evidence to support the full globalization thesis, the irrelevance 
of national location, in view of the continuing importance of the location of corporate headquarters 
and national origin for strategic decision making and for research and development (for R&D see 
e.g., Archibugi and Michie, 1997: 187).  Competitive pressures produce tendencies to globalization 
in production, with corporations seeking to reduce production costs through economies of scale or 
of scope in production, as well as market expansion.  But the same competitive pressures may lead 
to local diversity of products, because of the need to adjust to national variations in conditions and 
in consumer preferences.
Against the background of an overall concern with globalization, this paper examines the relation 
between multinational corporations and national business systems in CEE, with particular reference 
to Hungary.  It analyses globalization in practice.  In this paper, ‘multinationals’ are companies 
headquartered outside CEE operating internationally: companies headquartered in the region and 
operating internationally, such as MOL, the oil company, are referred to as ‘regional multinationals’. 
The term ‘business system’ refers both to state institutions, policies and practices regarding national 
economies, and to the institutions, policies and practices of business itself.  The sphere of production 
is especially critical for understanding globalization empirically, since it is the sphere in which 
globalization pressures have been most transformational.  International investors and multinational 
corporations have been the major engines of economic globalization.  However, although international 
investment decisions and international production systems may be conceived globally, they are 
conceived by nationally headquartered corporations and implemented with national resources.  Capital 
may be conceptualized as an abstract, de-materialized, symbolic medium of exchange, without physical 
form or location, but capital invested in production systems is not.  Moreover, the globalization of 
international standards in theory may be national in practice, as formal commitments to international 
standards and practices may be operated differently in practice.
Multinationals have been major agents of economic transformation in CEE, as the primary source 
of new capital investment, the main channel for the transfer of both physical and social technologies, 
and the major contributors both to regional exports and imports (Martin, 2011, for full discussion).  As 
the then Hungarian finance minister, Zsigmond Jarai, stated in 1998, foreign capital was ‘the only way 
to achieve comprehensive economic change and privatization’ in Hungary (Business Central Europe, 
December 1998:16).  The precise role played by multinationals in transforming CEE economies differed 
between countries and between sectors.  This paper investigates the relations between multinationals 
and national business systems focuses on Hungary, especially the sectors in which multinationals have 
been most active, motor vehicles and electronics, with limited comparative reference to the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Romania.  Amongst major CEE economies, Hungary adopted the most positive 
approach to foreign investment in the early 1990s, for example through prioritizing privatization by 
sale, and initial investment grants and allowances for foreign investors.
The major multinational companies operating in Hungary were German.  In manufacturing, the 
VW Group, with the Audi facilities in Gyor, was the largest foreign manufacturing employer in Hungary 
in 2010, with 10,000 employees.  Other German manufacturing multinationals included BMW, 
Bosche, Siemens, with the large Mercedes plant under construction in Kecskemet.  In utilities, Deutsche 
Telekom controlled Magyar Telekom, the landline and major mobile provider in Hungary; German 
companies controlled gas and electricity providers.  US multinationals included GE, which purchased 
the long established light bulb manufacturer Tungsram and converted it into GE Lighting.  The Dutch 
electronics manufacturer Philips operated three plants.  Japanese multinationals included Suzuki in 
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motor manufacturing and Sony in consumer electronics.  The Finnish mobile phone multinational 
Nokia operated a major plant in Komarom, in North West Hungary.  Korean multinationals included 
Samsung and Daewoo.  Chinese companies included the chemical multinational Wanhua, through its 
acquisition of control of Borsod.  The names in industrial parks throughout Hungary were similar to 
those found throughout Western Europe.  In distribution, the major supermarket chains were TESCO, 
the Austrian Kaisers and the French Carrefour.
Multinationals are now fully embedded in the economies of CEE: the issue is not their presence 
or significance but their precise role.  Multinationals may act in isolation from national business 
systems, responding to global strategic concerns, and playing little role in local economies, national 
discussions or national trading relations.  Alternatively, multinationals may be integrated into national 
business systems as full participants.  At one extreme, multinationals operate in isolation from national 
business systems, concentrating solely on contractual obligations and the contractual performance of 
supplier companies, as, for example, in outward processing arrangements between West European 
(UK, German and Italian) clothing retailers and manufacturers and their suppliers in the Romanian 
clothing industry, (Graziani, 1998; Lane and Probert, 2009).  Under outward processing arrangements, 
multinationals have little involvement with national business systems, except insofar as they impact 
directly upon contract performance, since the divestment of risks to suppliers is a major advantage 
of outward processing arrangements for multinationals.  At the other extreme, multinationals may 
have intense, close relations with national governments and businesses, for example where green-field 
investments require substantial public investment in local infrastructures.  Daimler-Benz canvassed 
several CEE governments regarding possible financial assistance for its potential investment in a new 
manufacturing facility to produce Mercedes-Benz cars in CEE, before deciding to build the new facility 
in Kecskemet, Hungary.  Hungarian national government and local government officials promised 
major investments in infrastructure.  Symbolizing this close relationship, plans for the new plant were 
unveiled in a joint ceremony in the Hungarian parliament in October 2008, with the signature of 
an agreement between the Chief Operating Officer of Mercedes-Benz and the Hungarian Minister 
for National Development and Economy, (then Gordon Bajnai, later Hungarian Prime Minister). 
Whether close or distant, relations may be collaborative or conflictual.
On the other side, national business systems may be exclusive, seeking to limit multinational access, 
with governments hesitant to encourage multinational investment because of fears losing control over 
‘the family silver’, and locally owned corporations regarding multinationals primarily as rivals and 
competitors, as in the Czech Republic in the early 1990s, during the first phase of privatization, and 
the attempt to develop a Czech ‘national capitalism’ (Myant, 2003).  Or national systems may be 
inclusive, with governments seeking to attract multinationals with favorable taxation arrangements, 
and national enterprises eager to encourage inward investment and to acquire contracts as suppliers. 
Hence, national investment offices were established to encourage inward investment, as the Hungarian 
ITD.  Sub-national regional governments may also play a role in business systems, for example in 
providing necessary transport infrastructure, or local inducements for inward investment, as Gyor 
successfully sought international investors.
Relations between multinationals and CEE national business systems were influenced by features 
of both the multinational and the national business system, and by the contexts within which their 
interactions occurred.  Contacts between multinationals and national business systems were formal and 
informal, institutional and behavioral.  Such contacts occurred at corporate level or, more frequently, 
between multinational subsidiaries or joint ventures and parts of the national business system.  The 
senior international corporate level was involved on symbolic occasions, such as plant inaugurations, 
in decisions central to the overall corporate strategy, such as in major plant developments in CEE, or 
initial country entry strategies, or in response to specific crises.  Multinational subsidiaries are defined 
here as ‘semiautonomous’ (Birkinshaw and Hood (1998: 780)) entities, capable of making their own 
decisions but constrained by the authority of head office managers.  Joint ventures are firms in which 
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multinationals share equity ownership with other entities, and which may or may not involve majority 
control by the multinational.  Subsidiaries were responsible for routine interactions.
The national business system incorporates national government, sector and firm level institutions, 
such as chambers of industry, employer’s organizations and trade unions.  At government level, the 
international and national political context conditioned relations with multinationals.  In the early 
1990s, the World Bank, the IMF and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), pressed CEE governments to open access to multinationals, the free movement of capital being 
increasingly required as a loan condition (Pop-Eleches, 2009); multinationals were the exemplars of the 
new capitalist order.  Such requirements were institutionalized in the 1993 Copenhagen conditions for 
EU accession.  National political contexts sometimes encouraged openness to multinational influences, 
as in Hungary in the 1990s, and sometimes discouraged it, as in the Czech Republic during the same 
period.  Within the more narrowly defined business system, the structure of ownership, especially the 
extent and form of privatization, and the degree of marketization influenced access for multinationals. 
Where firms remained tightly coupled to the state, through ownership or financial dependence, or to 
each other through dense network relations, bank financing and relational rather than market oriented 
inter-organizational links, the business environment was uncomfortable for multinational involvement, 
as in the Czech Republic in the 1990s.  At sector and firm level, the extent and familiarity of domestic 
firms with international peers and competitors and the technology gap between domestic enterprises 
and multinational subsidiaries, which affected the absorptive capacity of indigenous firms, influenced 
the character of relations with multinationals, in addition to direct commercial considerations (Meyer 
and Sinani, 2008).
The relations between multinationals and national business systems were not static,  changing 
in response to changes in the strategic interests of the corporation, and to developments in national 
business systems.  Multinational managers, like political leaders, responded to the political euphoria 
following the 1989 political revolutions, awakening general interest contrasting with the socialist 
period, when only a small number of specialized firms were interested in CEE.  In the early 1990s, 
multinationals sought two objectives.  The first was market access, which was secured rapidly in form, 
if hampered by non-tariff barriers.  The second was investment opportunities in privatization projects, 
provided ownership rights could be guaranteed.  Hence, international investment expanded rapidly 
in Hungary, where governments sought to privatize assets by sale to strategic investors, and where 
the prices paid reflected the sellers’ anxieties to sell.  In contrast, the Czechoslovak policy of voucher 
privatization excluded foreigners.  In addition to negotiating on price and terms and conditions such as 
guarantees of investment levels and employment, multinationals sought to secure advantageous market 
access through restrictions on market entry by competitors.  Privileged market access was especially 
important for multinationals in mature market sectors, such as motor vehicles, during the early stages 
of the transformation, but also retained importance during the later stages of the transformation for 
companies investing in utility privatizations, telecommunications and banking (Meyer and Jensen, 
2005:133).  Priorities changed later, when the logic of exchange was supplemented by the logic of 
production, raising the importance of enterprise capabilities and performance.
National business systems themselves changed in an uneven process of transformation from the 
structures of state socialism.  During the initial phase of post socialist capitalism, firms formed systems 
of ‘heterarchy’, with complex ‘recombinant’ inter-firm networks, involving links amongst firms, 
between firms and banks, and between firms and state institutions, based on inter-corporate ownership, 
formal agreements, and informal understandings (Grabher and Stark, 1997; Stark and Bruszt, 1997; 
McDermott, 2003).  Such recombinant networks posed major obstacles for multinationals, since 
the relationships amongst network members and their economic behavior were opaque rather than 
transparent.  Understanding networks required background information on institutional and personal 
histories, rarely available to external multinationals.  The period of heterarchy proved transitory, 
changing more rapidly and more thoroughly in some countries, Hungary, than in others, the Czech 
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Republic (Stark and Vedres, 2006; McDermott, 2003).  The gradual disintegration of recombinant 
networks, and increasing marketization of ownership and of production relationships in Hungary, 
especially after 1997, simplified ownership structures, encouraged concentration, increased the 
transparency of economic behavior and thereby eased the transfer of corporate assets into foreign 
ownership (Stark and Vedres, 2006).  The simplification of ownership arrangements which occurred 
from 1997, including increases in foreign ownership, progressively accelerated the marketization 
process.  Further marketization in turn fostered loosely coupled business systems, with more flexibility 
and greater openness to multinational influence than tightly coupled systems, providing more 
opportunities for multinational incorporation and active participation in national business systems. 
The more rapid progress of marketization in Hungary than in the Czech Republic or Poland provided 
greater potential for multinational involvement in the national business systems, in turn accelerating 
the process of marketization.  In contrast to Hungary, the secondary transfer of shares in privatizations 
resulted in consolidation of ownership by banks and financial institutions in the Czech Republic and 
in ownership by other domestic enterprises in Poland, complicating and slowing down the process of 
foreign investment (Blaszczyk et al., 2003).
In sum, the strategic interests of multinationals and national governments were both complementary 
and conflictual, governed by both economic and political considerations.  For multinationals, CEE 
offered new markets and a possible base for low cost production facilities.  For CEE governments, 
multinationals were the most promising source of capital investment and technological know how.  The 
relations between them occurred at several levels, both national and at the level of the business system, 
including sector and enterprise levels.  With increasing marketization, and the partial de-politicization 
of regional economies, relations between multinationals and CEE regional economies became more 
similar to those of Western Europe, whilst retaining specific sensitivities reflecting recent political and 
economic histories.
This paper outlines the factors affecting such relationships, within the context of globalization debates. 
It is divided into four sections.  The following second section views the issues from the perspective of 
multinational corporations.  The section outlines the strategies followed by multinationals investing in 
CEE, and the structural factors which stimulated, or inhibited, full engagement with regional business 
systems.  The paper views CEE experience in the context of multinationals’ international strategies, 
not as a unique regional experience.  The section also documents the differences between sectors 
by examining briefly the experience of companies in the motor car, electronics and pharmaceutical 
industries.  The paper argues that multinational engagement was conditioned by two factors.  The first 
factor was corporate strategy, the result of national influences at the multinational place of headquarters 
location, the interests of corporate management and the corporation as a corporate body, as well as 
competitive market conditions, varying between sectors.  The second feature was organization structure, 
especially the degree of subsidiary autonomy: the higher the level of autonomy, the greater the scope 
and potential for national involvement.  Some multinational subsidiaries were tightly constrained by 
the corporate head office (Coca Cola), others were granted significant autonomy (ABB); greater local 
autonomy enabled more extensive local linkages, both at government and at business unit level.  The 
third section of the paper sketches national business systems at three levels: the state, the business 
system as a system, and the economic culture.  The concluding fourth section returns to the issue of 
the relations between multinationals and the national business system, and the balance of dependences 
between the two sides.  Overall, the evidence suggests that multinationals acted independently of 
national business systems, rather than as integrated participants - cathedrals in the desert rather than 
local parish churches for the community.
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2 .  Mu l t i n a t i o n a l s  a n d  n a t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  s y s t em s :  t h e  mu l t i n a t i o n a l 
p e r s p e c t i v e
This section analyses the overall strategies pursued by multinationals, the structures established to 
coordinate and control their strategies, and the processes of implementation.  Following Porter 
(1980), multinationals follow one of three overall strategies, cost leadership, differentiation, or focus. 
In establishing the structures to coordinate and control their strategies, multinationals balance the 
requirements of central control and brand integrity against the needs for local responsiveness.  The 
balance differs between industrial sectors and product markets.  The balance struck between central 
control and local responsiveness is also affected by a range of organizational factors, including national 
origin, mode of subsidiary acquisition and the mandate allocated to the subsidiary by the corporation.
Relations between multinationals and national business systems had a dual character.  On the one 
hand, financial, technological, operational, and market ties linked multinationals and their subsidiaries 
to the core international business system, of which CEE forms a small part.  The major sources of 
finance for multinational CEE operations were international, initially through direct international 
investment and increasingly via intra-company loans and transfers from international owners; loans 
replaced equity and foreign direct investment.  Local capital markets and national bank loans and 
credit played little part.  Technology was internationally sourced, heavily reliant upon corporate centers 
for R&D and, with important exceptions, for process innovations; private sector expenditure on R&D 
in the region was very low (Dyker, 1997).  Materials and components were sourced internationally. 
The major sources of inputs (raw materials, components, subassemblies) were international, with high 
levels of imported items incorporated into subsequent exports from the region.  Regional suppliers 
played only a marginal role, and were themselves often subsidiaries of other foreign multinationals. 
Production systems and supply chains were built and operated on a global, or at least international, 
basis, and in the short run required foreign technical support.  The major product markets were also 
international, with much higher levels of exports than domestic sales and than domestically owned 
enterprises.  Human resource issues were traditionally handled with a limited degree of decentralization 
to national level for senior level employees, whilst allowing greater decentralization in the handling of 
lower level employees (Scullion and Linehan, 2005: 41-2).  Local employment relations policies were 
increasingly modeled on international practice, with time limited contracts, financial and functional 
flexibility and higher salaries, as exemplified in GE’s practices following its takeover of the Hungarian 
lighting company Tungsram and its transformation into GE Lighting.  Multinationals hesitated to join 
employers’ associations, involved in pattern setting collective bargaining arrangements, or to participate 
in joint arrangements for lobbying governments, in Hungary (Comisso, 1998: n.p.).  Labor markets, 
especially at the higher managerial level, were international.  Expatriate managers defined their careers 
in terms of international career paths, expecting to serve only a short time (two or three years) in the 
country.  Regional managers aspired to careers abroad, or at least to remain with the multinational to 
maintain a higher income than their peers employed by locally owned enterprises.  To secure their route 
to the heavens, multinational regional managers enrolled on MBA programs, seeking international 
certification.
On the other hand, multinationals were necessarily embedded in national systems, and became 
increasingly sensitive to national expectations over a period of time.  At a minimum, even cathedrals 
needed sewerage, waste disposal, access to public utilities and efficient means of communication. 
Multinationals were integrated into national systems through their requirements for infrastructure: 
electricity, gas, water, rail, road, and telecommunications.  Multinational complaints about the 
inadequacies of the national telecommunications infrastructure were widespread in the early 1990s, and 
led to pressure for accelerated international investment, both public and private.  Multinationals were 
also sensitive to utility prices, with prices initially kept low for individual consumers at the expense of 
commercial users, as during the socialist period.  Multinationals depended upon national governments 
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for political support, appropriate legislation, favorable or at least equitable exercise of state administrative 
discretion, the creation of a secure legal framework and recruitment of a judiciary capable of enforcing 
contracts fairly.  The protection of the property rights of minority investors was particularly important 
for enabling initial portfolio investment by institutional investors and their agents.  The effective 
utilization of multinational investment in production facilities depended upon recruiting a competent 
and committed labor force.  The education level, qualifications, skills, and working culture of the labor 
force depended upon appropriate state policies and local provision, as well as upon the training and 
resources provided by the multinationals themselves.  Multinationals obtained financial benefit from 
state funds in the form of investment grants, tax allowances, and special arrangements for financing 
investments in research and development, sometimes on more advantageous terms than local firms. 
Multinationals were also linked to other national firms, which supplied subassemblies and parts, and 
specialized professional support when required.  Other firms, as well as final consumers, also provided 
product markets, even for export oriented multinationals.
2.1. Multinational strategies
Multinational strategies and the structures established to implement them provided the threads 
linking multinationals and national business systems together.  Porter’s classic typology of generic 
strategies for competitive advantage distinguished between cost leadership, differentiation and focus 
(Porter, 1980:40-41).  Different strategies had different implications for relations with national business 
systems.  Cost leadership required sustained capital investment and access to capital, products designed 
for ease of manufacture, process engineering skills, close supervision of labor, and low cost distribution 
systems.  Organizationally, cost leadership involved tightly structured organizations and control 
systems, frequent reporting arrangements and quantitative incentives.  Differentiation required strong 
capability in basic research, long experience in the industry or the possession of unique skills, corporate 
reputation for quality, strong marketing skills, product engineering, and creative flair.  The strategy 
required recruitment of creative professionals, sensitive qualitative incentives and close cooperation 
between functions.  Focus strategies involved a combination of the requirements of the cost leadership 
and differentiation strategies, with a direct concentration on the specific needs of the chosen market. 
The three broad strategies were relevant to international operations, as well as to domestic.  Cost 
leadership strategies were more likely to lead to investment in CEE than either differentiation or focus 
strategies, in view of the resource endowments of CEE.  Multinational strategies were long term but 
not permanent, required to change in response to competitive pressures, for example with increasing 
sophistication of products, as in mobile telephones, with consequent implications for relations with 
regional economies, especially regarding labor issues.
Within the corporation’s overall strategies of cost leadership, differentiation, and focus, the 
internationalization strategy was determined by the trade off between standardization and national 
responsiveness, linked to the nature of product markets and to customer demands.  Standardized 
products, and centralized production facilities, were associated with cost leadership, diverse products 
and decentralized production facilities were associated with differentiation.  Where substantial 
economies could be derived from global standardization and size, corporations adopted one of two 
alternative types of strategy.  The first was ‘global’ strategy, when the need for localization was low, as 
in standardized products such as razor blades.  Where the global corporation produced standardized 
products for international distribution, only marketing needed to be handled locally, as, for example, 
Coca-Cola.  Production was concentrated, the location determined by comparative advantage - labor 
costs, the availability of raw materials, or, in capital intensive production, the cost of capital.  The 
second was ‘trans-national’ strategies, when the need for localization was high, as in some categories 
of food manufacture.  In trans-national strategies, corporations sought to standardize production 
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arrangements whilst individualizing customer facing elements.  Management consultancies were the 
exemplars, combining global information exchange with local knowledge and connections, often 
through hiring regional citizens.
Multinational business practice was less coherent and tidy than Porter’s analyses suggest, involving 
managing the tension between different, often contradictory, requirements: achieving scale economies 
in production needed to be balanced alongside satisfying the specific, local tastes of consumers.  As in 
the food industry, ‘There is not something like a global consumer in the food and beverage industry…
There is only the local consumer.…everything that the consumer can see, touch, feel or taste has to be 
local.  That means that our products, our brands, and our communications will always stay local in order 
to stay relevant to the local consumer.  On the other hand, of course, everything which the consumer 
does not see, taste, smell, or feel can be rationalized.  It can be centralized.  It can be regionalized and 
globalized.  This is basically the balance we’re trying to find’ (CEO of Nestle, quoted in Inkpen and 
Ramaswamy, 2006: 60).  The balance between minimizing production costs and meeting the specific 
requirements of national markets changes, with changes in technology and the costs of production, 
on the one hand, and in consumer preferences on the other.  Moreover, firms consisting of diversified 
portfolios of companies, or companies producing a variety of products, needed to operate different 
approaches within the same organization.
In implementing international strategies, multinationals adopted a classic matrix between corporate 
coordination and configuration, in which the coordination of activities ranged from high to low, 
and the configuration of activities ranged from dispersed to concentrated (Porter, 1986).  Efficient 
implementation of all three strategies involved coordinated corporate control and management.  The 
specific organizational requirements differed between the three strategies.  Overall corporate strategies, 
and the structures established to implement them, had obvious implications for multinationals operating 
in CEE.  Strategies based on cost leadership were more likely to lead to investment in the region, 
especially for products where the cost of labor comprised a high proportion of production costs, since 
low labor costs were a source of national competitive advantage.  Differentiation strategies required a 
different combination of factor endowments, less likely to be found in CEE, and more difficult to foster.
Global production systems, in which subsidiaries performed a defined and controlled role in 
corporate strategies devised centrally, were characteristic of the motor vehicle and electronics industries, 
especially for companies seeking high market shares in mass markets.  However, differentiation strategies 
implied different organizational structures and arrangements.  The model of global production systems 
had diminished relevance for sectors in which innovation and R&D played the central role, as in 
IT software and pharmaceuticals, with specific areas of knowledge and expertise widely distributed 
throughout the corporation.  For such sectors, autonomy resided with groups possessing distinctive 
capabilities, whether at the corporate centre or in the subsidiary.  Subsidiary autonomy was therefore 
greater where core capabilities were decentralized, especially where production methods remained 
difficult to standardize, as in software engineering throughout the 1990s, the costs of production were 
low, as in pharmaceuticals, or specialized R&D was dispersed internationally.  Software engineering and 
pharmaceuticals were two sectors in which a small number of CEE companies achieved prominence, 
as with the Hungarian company Graphisoft in the use of software in architectural design or Richter in 
pharmaceuticals.
Motor vehicle manufacturers who established plants in Hungary followed cost leadership 
strategies, with low levels of discretion for regional subsidiaries.  Motor manufacturers producing 
according to global production strategies, with major investments in CEE, included VW, General 
Motors/Opel, Ford, Renault-Nissan, and Fiat, with VW as the largest and most important in Central 
Europe.  Japanese motor manufacturers were slower to invest in CEE, with Suzuki, the relatively small 
Japanese firm, being the only early Japanese motor manufacturer in Hungary.  The assemblers followed 
similar strategies.  Motor vehicle strategies sought high economies of scale and scope, with limited need 
for localization.
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The subsidiaries acquired or established in CEE played a defined role in corporate 
internationalization, and possessed limited autonomy.  Decisions were made at central, corporate 
level, with little responsiveness to the specifics of national concerns.  Hence, the VW Group’s strategy 
initially allocated Skoda the role of supplier of entry level vehicles to emerging markets.  The VW 
Group proved unable to fulfill its initial undertakings to the Czech government on output, employment 
level, and capital investment, due to the recession of the early 1990s, leading to overt conflict with the 
Czech government. Following its purchase of Dacia, Renault-Nissan allocated a similar role to Dacia 
in Romania, with the production of Dacia/Logan cars as reliable, low priced entry level vehicles. 
Skoda’s role within the VW strategy changed, with the Czech company’s high quality standards, and 
Skoda’s market share in Western Europe expanded beyond initial expectations.  Because of the impact 
of Skoda developments on VW itself, with the potential cannibalization of VW markets in Western 
Europe, the Group was anxious to manage the expansion of Skoda cautiously, retaining control 
of strategic decisions.  In global production systems, the human resource management approach 
adopted may also reflect the corporation’s global strategic conception, for example in developing new 
techniques in CEE for use elsewhere in the corporation, as innovations at the Audi plant in Gyor, 
Hungary, and GM/Opel investments in Poland, were seen as trials for transfer to assembler plants in 
Germany (Meardi, 2002).
Multinationals operating in Hungary included components’ manufacturers, such as Bosch, as well 
as final assemblers.  In the 1990s, major assemblers followed similar production strategies, involving 
modularization, development of common platforms across several models, and ‘de-virtualization’, with 
increased outsourcing of component production (Radosevic and Rozeik, 2005).  Such strategies involved 
increased rationalization and concentration of production, reducing employment in the assemblers 
themselves, whilst increasing it in first tier suppliers.  The increased demands on component suppliers 
for more sophisticated components, requiring sub-assemblies (for example, braking systems) rather 
than single components, increased the importance of first tier suppliers.  The increasingly sophisticated 
requirements led to reliance on heavily capitalized suppliers, with their own design capability, such as 
Bosch, rather than locally owned suppliers, even where components were sourced locally.  First tier 
suppliers were initially scarce in CEE (Dyker, 2006).  However, Western first tier suppliers followed 
Western assemblers, as the German headlight manufacturer Hella Hueck of Lippstadt followed VW’s 
investment in Skoda in Mlada Boleslav, and Bosch developed major facilities in Hungary, supporting 
VW’s Audi investment in Gyor.
Similar strategic considerations affected the electronics industry.  Like motor vehicles, electronics is 
a global industry dominated by large multinationals.  The sector covered a diverse range of products and 
services, ranging from consumer electronics, including televisions, to telecommunications, computers, 
ITCs to electronic industrial control systems.  Different product markets had different dynamics, with 
industrial markets differing from final consumer markets.  Consumer electronics included mature 
markets, such as televisions, and rapidly changing markets, such as mobile communications and 
computer games.  It included mass markets and highly specialized industrial markets.  Despite the range 
of products and markets, and the shifting contours of the sector, there were synergies between sectors 
that reinforced the competitive advantage of comprehensive rather than specialized firms (Chandler, 
2002).  Even small players sought to cover a wide range of products.  The major multinationals were 
based in Japan, US, and increasingly Korea and China, with Philips as the sole European global 
electronics major.  The Japanese dominated consumer electronics (Matsushita, Sony, Sharp and Sanyo), 
and challenged the US in computers, with Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, Toshiba and Mitsubishi.  The US 
dominated computers: in 1996, six of the ten largest IT companies (by revenue) were American (IBM, 
Hewlett-Packard, Compaq, Electronic Data Systems, Digital and Microsoft) (Chandler, 2001:232), 
although US dominance subsequently declined, especially in ‘mature’ sectors such as P.Cs., with 
massive Chinese and Korean expansion.  Corporate strategies focused on providing the conditions 
for radical product innovation, speed of new product development, and reducing production costs. 
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Although the generic concerns were similar to the motor vehicles manufacturers, the emphasis differed, 
with even greater attention focused on new product development, with faster product life-cycles; more 
differentiation, less cost leadership.
Organizational changes in the international electronics industry paralleled those of the motor 
vehicle sector, with corporate disintegration.  Major multinationals increasingly concentrated on core 
activities, primarily R&D and marketing, seen as the definers of the brand, whilst outsourcing non-
core activities (Sturgeon, 1998).  The definition of non-core widened in the 1990s, extending from 
ancillary support activities such as catering and routine administration to the production of major 
product components.  Hence, in computer manufacture, competing manufacturers used standardized 
chips, initially from Intel, within their own branded machines.  Such ‘turnkey production networks’, 
pioneered by US companies in the 1990s, economized on production costs and secured access to the 
most sophisticated component R&D, whilst maintaining product differentiation (Sturgeon, 1998).
Within the context of such trends, CEE was a small but growing player.  By 1999, the overall value 
of electronics production in CEE was $26bn (Radosevic, 2002:1).  Before 1989, the CEE electronics 
industry had developed very differently from the western industry, within the framework of CMEA 
(Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance) specialization.  R&D focused on the defense sector, 
isolated from access to advanced technology by COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Export Controls) regulations.  Consumer electronics, such as televisions, were produced in CEE 
(especially Poland), and traded within CMEA, but to low quality (and aesthetic) standards, whilst 
access to information technologies was strictly controlled, both domestically and internationally. 
Telecommunications technology was especially backward, outside defense.  The change of economic 
regime destroyed the regional companies that served domestic markets, unable to compete with the 
increased sophistication, and social cachet, of western goods, and undermined by the cheap prices of 
eastern imports.  Electronics multinationals were attracted to CEE by its potential both as a regional 
market and as a manufacturing base, close to the EU markets.  However, western electronics companies 
were slower to invest than western car manufacturers.  Low incomes initially restricted regional 
markets for sophisticated consumer electronics, whilst technological backwardness and the absence 
of up-to-date sector specific manufacturing experience raised doubts about the ability of companies to 
match western production requirements.  Moreover, the Japanese companies that dominated sectors 
of the electronics industry had traditionally maintained close control over production, and integrated 
production closely with R&D.
Nevertheless, by 1998 major western electronics companies had established substantial production 
facilities in CEE.  Hungary was the most popular destination for electronics companies.  IBM 
(US) subsidiary IBM Storage Products Kft. in Szekesfehervar was the largest company by net 
sales, manufacturing disk drives.  Philips (Netherlands) manufactured a wide range of products, 
including televisions, domestic appliances, medical systems, communications systems, PC monitors, 
car stereo systems, hair clippers and foil shaver parts, in 17 factories.  Sony (Japan) Hungaria Kft. 
manufactured audio devices, Nokia (Finland) Display Products Kft. manufactured monitors and 
subsequently mobile phones, Samsung (Korea) manufactured TV sets, Ericsson (Sweden) and Siemens 
(Germany) manufactured telephone exchanges (Radosevic, 2002:16).  In Poland, the French company 
Thomson, Philips as well as the Korean company Daewoo, manufactured TV sets and components, 
Alcatel (Fr), Siemens (German) and Lucent (Netherlands) manufactured telecoms equipment; 
Philips also manufactured lighting  and batteries; Motorola developed IC assembly plant on a green 
field site in Krakow.  In the Czech Republic, Philips established three plants to manufacture TV 
picture tubes, components and electronic microscopes, Siemens established plants for telecoms and 
automotive electronics, and Matsushista established plants to manufacture TVs, electrical resisters and 
electromagnetic relays.
There were three types of companies in the sector. The first type was major multinationals, covering 
a wide range of products, of which the most active was Philips. Philips’ subsidiaries were integrated into 
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the company’s global strategy, but with greater structural autonomy than comparable US electronics 
multinationals.  Secondly, the Finnish company, Elcoteq, was a smaller multinational, whose fortunes 
were linked closely with the fortunes of larger multinationals, especially Nokia.  The two multinationals 
differed sharply from the third company, Videoton, a domestically owned privatized Hungarian 
company, which developed out of a major socialist era electronics company to become a small regional 
multinational.  Whereas Philips and Elcoteq operated on a global basis; Videoton’s international success 
depended upon agility in responding to technological and markets changes.
Philips, based in Eindhoven and with its major listing on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, operated 
through three sectors, Consumer Lifestyle, Healthcare and Lighting.  At the end of 2009, it had 127 
production facilities in 29 countries, including three in Hungary: Szombathely, Szekesfehervar and 
Gyor.  The three facilities employed 4700 in 2009, representing a reduction of 1000 on a year earlier, 
as part of the company’s global cost cutting.  The Szekesfehervar plant manufactured electric shavers 
and vacuum cleaners, two intensely competitive markets.  In 2009, four events symbolized the changes 
taking place in Philips in Hungary, with its transition into a manufacturing plant serving national 
as well as international markets, with lower employment levels and higher levels of investment in 
production facilities.  First, a Dutch chief executive was succeeded by a Hungarian, Gabor Koves 
(Amcham, 2010).  Secondly, Philips sales in Hungary increased, from EUR 264m to EUR 275m, 
despite the recession, indicating growth in the domestic market share.  Third, the level of exports 
declined, from EUR 2.1bn to EUR 1.9bn, reflecting the overall fall in demand for consumer electronics 
during economic recession.  Fourth, the company continued to invest in Hungary, EUR 25m, including 
the development of production of 3D televisions in Szekesfehervar.
Elcoteq is a medium sized Finnish multinational.  The company produced consumer electronics 
– mobile phones, flat screen TVs – and systems solutions.  The company defined itself as a ‘Global 
Life Cycle Service Partner for high tec. product and service companies’, operating as a ‘low margin 
electronics manufacturing services business’.  The company was organized into two strategic business 
units, consumer electronics and communications, served by a small corporate headquarters whose 
responsibilities included the development of new customers.  Finnish owned and quoted on the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange, it was headquartered in Luxembourg; its major shareholders were a small 
group of Finnish managers, with little institutional shareholding.  At its peak, Elcoteq operated eight 
plants in Europe – Estonia, Russia, Sweden and Switzerland, as well as Finland (Espoo) and Hungary 
(Pecs), with additional plants in the US (Texas) and China.  The company had revenues of EUR 4.5bn 
and 18,000 employees at its peak, but in 2009 the number of employees dropped to 10,000 and net 
revenues to EUR 1.5bn.  The company began operations in Pecs in 1998, manufacturing electronic 
communications devices, and expanded in 2000 when it purchased Nokia’s plant manufacturing 
mobile telephones.  The company employed 7000 at its Pecs plants in 2007.  The company was badly 
hit by the recession in the electronics industry in 2009, and lost over a billion EUR in the first quarter 
of 2010; it was reported as having received financial support from Kaifa, part of the China Electronic 
Corporation (Brestow, 2009).  The company consolidated its European operations in Pecs, selling 
its other European manufacturing facilities and expanding its operations in China.  The company 
considered moving its headquarters to Pecs in 2010.  Even in Pecs, the number of employees halved, to 
3500 by 2010.  In addition to the overall decline in its business areas, the company was hit by Nokia’s 
decision to take mobile phone production back in-house.  Elcoteq was not a major multinational. 
However, it was important in the context of the Hungarian industry, as a major employer in Pecs; 
its Board of Directors included Sandor Csanyi, the CEO of the major Hungarian bank OTP.  It 
covered a wide range of activities in the industry, but, as a contracting company, it was dependent on 
decisions made by major multinationals.  The company’s corporate governance fitted the Hungarian 
context, with the majority of voting shares owned by members of management or former members of 
management, and the absence of international institutional investors.
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Videoton was Hungary’s largest privately owned company, with 9000 employees, assets of EUR 
353m, and revenues of EUR 290m in 2008.  The company operated through seven subsidiaries in five 
segments – automotive (45%), office automation (4%), industrial systems (18%), household appliances 
(irons, vacuum cleaners) (25%) and others.  The company viewed the industrial services sector as the most 
promising for future development.  Videoton was a contracting electronic services company, in 2009 
the 5th largest in Europe.  The company had plants in Szekesfehervar, its headquarters, and Kaposvar 
in Hungary, and Stara Zagora in Bulgaria (purchased in 1999), with facilities in the Ukraine (2009). 
The company was originally founded in 1938, and was a major electronics firm in the socialist period, 
employing 18,000 in the 1980s.  Following the collapse of its CEE markets in 1989, the factory became 
moribund.  It was privatized in 1991, bought by three managers (10%) and the Magyar Hitel Bank 
(75%), with 15% remaining with the State Property Agency; the three managers acquired full control 
in 1996.  The purchasers included Gabor Szeles, an entrepreneur who operated an electronics repair 
firm Musczertechnika in the 1980s, with direct experience of cooperating with western companies, 
including IBM.  In the post socialist period the company acted as the organizing center of a network 
of Hungarian electronics companies (Radosevic and Yoruk, 2001).  In 1998 it adopted a new strategy 
of providing a full service manufacturing facility, using its network of Hungarian associate companies. 
The company expanded rapidly from EUR 170m in 2004 to EUR 290m in 2007.  The company 
proved agile in negotiating changes in the industry, moving to new sectors as markets in existing 
sectors deteriorated.  In 2008 the company signed an agreement to manufacture batteries for Sanyo at 
Marcalli.  With increasing production costs in Hungary, Videoton expanded production in Bulgaria 
and the Ukraine.  With increasing turbulence in the market, the company was forced to undertake a 
range of smaller and more diverse contracts, reducing margins.
The electronics industry shared many trends with the motor vehicle industry.  In both, international 
competitive pressures led to a focus both on speed of new product development and minimizing 
the costs of production.  In both industries, the result was a focus by the major multinationals on 
core corporate capabilities and outsourcing other activities.  Networks replaced both hierarchies and 
markets in both sectors, as the most efficient means of reconciling controlling costs with fast new 
product development, whilst maintaining management coherence.  Networks provided greater security 
and fewer risks than exclusive reliance on markets, especially where firms shared a common interest 
in technological innovations, as in computer manufacture (Sturgeon, 1998).  CEE businesses were 
required to fit in with this framework.  The main assets of CEE for the US and Japanese multinationals 
that dominated the electronics industry were low production costs and proximity to the European 
market.  However, these assets were less important to the electronics sector than to the car industry, 
since labor costs were a relatively low component of overall costs and the low unit costs of transportation 
reduced the value of proximity.  Moreover, the importance of network links for accelerating new 
product development reinforced the advantages of agglomeration in specific regions in Japan and the 
US, rather than in CEE.  Electronics companies were therefore slower to develop production sites in 
CEE than car manufacturers.  Nevertheless, there were sectors of the industry for which the CEE 
offered advantages, based partly on the historic legacy of socialist companies.  In lighting, the historic 
strength of Hungary’s Tungsram led GE to purchase the company, which came to provide a focus for 
research and development in the lighting area, as light bulb manufacture became increasingly complex, 
although by 2010 it was facing intense competition for GE’s R&D investment in lighting from China. 
Companies such as Philips invested in product development for the sector, alongside a diversity of 
production sites.  The particular requirements of the highly regulated telecommunications industry led 
to investment in telecommunications, for example by Ericsson, Nokia and Siemens in Hungary, and 
by Siemens in Poland.
CEE electronics companies were mainly involved in fabrication, rather than research and 
development, and in relatively mature technologies.  Radosevic (2002:18) concluded early in the 2000s 
that CEE countries were ‘present in technically less demanding areas such as passive components, 
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audio equipment and technically less complicated computer parts, except hard discs’.  The situation had 
changed slightly by 2010, for example with expansion and upgrading in telecommunications.  Hungary 
was the most dynamic CEE country in the sector, and Hungarian companies were incorporated into 
global production networks.  But their position was fragile, and dependent upon combining agility 
with labor cost advantages.  As the labor cost advantage waned, and Romania and the Ukraine became 
more promising manufacturing sites, multinational investment moved elsewhere; the one-time largest 
US investment in the electronics industry, IBM’s Szekesfehervar plant manufacturing hard disc drives, 
was closed in 2002, although IBM continued other activities.  Indigenous CEE companies, such 
as Videoton, survived by moving agilely between sectors, and providing a wide range of services at 
reasonable cost.
The strategic considerations affecting the motor vehicle and electronics industries were not shared 
by other sectors, where trans-national strategies were more appropriate, such as pharmaceuticals.  The 
implications of the global strategies of pharmaceutical companies differed from those of motor vehicle 
companies, permitting greater national variations.  GlaxoSmithKline, for example, concentrated 
research in the US, Britain and Japan, with production facilities distributed globally.  They did not 
establish a major research facility in CEE.  However, early stage research in pharmaceuticals was often 
initiated by smaller start up companies, to be taken over by larger companies where the initial results 
were promising; the more expensive product development, testing, and approvals procedures were 
concentrated in major metropolitan markets, usually the US, by far the largest national market for 
ethical pharmaceuticals.  Lower cost production facilities were established in the region, both for ethical 
drugs and for generic drugs.  There was less need for the global coordination of the production process 
itself, provided local quality controls were effective, since production costs were a lower proportion of 
total costs, and governments were keen to secure local production centers.
The overall strategy of the corporation and the related technological requirements of the production 
system were the primary influences upon multinational capacity for incorporation into national business 
systems.  The critical factor was the inter-relatedness between the subsidiary’s production system and 
the production systems of other firms in the multinational, both vertically and horizontally.  Several 
subsidiaries were responsible for supplying components and sub-assemblies for end user products 
completed elsewhere, as first tier suppliers to a final assembler in motor vehicles, as the Audi plant 
in Gyor (Hungary) supplied engines for Audi cars assembled in Germany.  Toyota style industrial 
engineering involved tightly coupled and controlled production systems, enabled by investment in 
IT, to ensure quality standards as well as to maintain continuity of production.  When the subsidiary 
achieved global mandate status, the level of subsidiary autonomy was limited by global responsibilities. 
The degree of coupling depended upon the variability and specificity of product markets: enterprises 
supplying diverse products to specific national markets acquired greater autonomy than enterprises 
supplying standardized products to global markets.  The development of global production systems, 
with limited subsidiary autonomy, was at its peak during the Fordist era of the 1970s, when economies 
of scale reduced production costs and provided competitive advantage, and was strongest in the motor 
industry, but the logic continued after the Fordist peak.
2.2. Multinational organizational structures
The major feature of organizational structure influencing subsidiary relations with national business 
systems was the degree of autonomy granted to the subsidiary by corporate headquarters.  The higher 
the level of subsidiary autonomy, the greater was the potential for involvement with national business 
systems.  The degree of autonomy differed according to a range of organizational features, operating 
within parameters set by corporate strategies, production systems and sector and product markets.
Three organizational features influenced the degree of subsidiary discretion.  The first was the 
multinational’s country of origin, with national differences in the extent to which corporate head offices 
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were willing to decentralize power and authority.  The second was the ownership status of the national 
subsidiary within the multinational, whether the subsidiary was wholly owned, a minority holding or 
a joint venture.  Enterprises operated as joint ventures were more heavily incorporated into national 
business systems than the other two ownership forms.  The third feature was the mode of acquisition of 
the subsidiary, whether through privatization, post privatization acquisition, or green field investment.
Multinationals headquartered in different countries allowed different levels of autonomy to their 
subsidiaries (Harzing, 1999).  At one extreme, Japanese owned multinationals allowed little autonomy, 
Japanese corporations believing strongly in the importance of retaining Japanese methods of working, 
especially in subsidiaries engaged in manufacturing and manufacturing related R&D.  The reluctance 
to allow autonomy was due to both cultural and operational factors.  Culturally, Japanese retained a 
high level of consciousness of their nationality, with a strong emphasis on group cohesion and loyalty 
(Dore, 1987; Kono and Clegg, 1998).  Operationally, as Fruin comments regarding Toshiba, ‘going 
overseas or internationalizing operations reduced flexibility because […]the complexity and versatility of 
manufacturing systems as they exist in Japan cannot be easily transferred abroad.  The nature of factory 
know-how is not contained in manuals but is found instead in practice and experience.  This history 
is embodied in factory-specific, face-to-face relations, on-the-job training, and in people-based, site-
specific knowledge.  Complex and sticky knowledge, in turn, is rooted in the principle of organizational 
learning in which effective, usable learning concentrates and resides in specific work sites, functions and 
interactions.  Such knowledge cannot be simply transferred elsewhere’ (Fruin, 1997:162).  Given such 
views, it is unsurprising that Toshiba was reluctant to establish production plants overseas, and that 
when Japanese plants were established overseas Japanese nationals retained senior management control. 
This reluctance was especially evident over transferring operations to countries with which Japan had 
little historical connection or cultural affinity, such as Hungary.  The only Toshiba production facility 
in CEE produced TVs in Poland, a relatively mature technology.  In motor vehicles, the earliest major 
Japanese investor in CEE was Suzuki, established in Esztergom as early as 1992, and ranked 9th out of 
36 in level of investment in CEE between 1990 and 2000 (Radosevic and Rozeik, 2005: 26).  Suzuki 
was an adventurous but relatively small manufacturer, specializing in small and light-weight vehicles; 
although it became the long term market leader in Hungary, as well as a major exporter, the first car 
regarded as suitable for marketing in Japan was produced only in 2008.
The major US multinationals were also strongly committed to maintaining central control, and 
requiring their subsidiaries to follow US practices, including human resources practices.  German, 
Dutch and British multinationals granted greater autonomy to their subsidiaries (Harzing, 1999; 
Edwards and Rees, 2006: 114-7).  German multinationals were the largest investors in CEE, both in 
manufacturing and in services.  The cultural difference between German multinationals and regional 
companies was less than the cultural difference between Japanese and regional corporations, in view 
of the long historical links between Germany and Hungary.  Cultural similarity and proximity eased 
control issues, permitting greater autonomy for German than for Japanese subsidiaries.
The second factor influencing the degree of subsidiary discretion was the ownership status of the 
subsidiary.  Wholly or majority owned multinationals were more oriented towards the international 
corporate headquarters and sensitive to corporate expectations than companies in which multinationals 
were minority participants.  In Majcen et al.’s study of foreign subsidiaries in five CEE countries, 
including Hungary, majority ownership was the major factor influencing the level of central control of 
subsidiary business functions (2006:23), although the measure of ownership used was crude.  The most 
common ownership pattern was wholly owned subsidiary both in Majcen et al (2006:10) and in other 
studies.  In Jindra’s study of Global Integration and Local Capability, using 425 subsidiaries (Jindra, 
2007:32, Table A 1) in five CEE countries, the majority of subsidiaries (56 per cent) were wholly owned, 
including 64 per cent in Hungary and 49 per cent in Poland.  Mannix et al. (2004) hypothesized 
that the degree of central control increased with the level of ownership, a hypothesis confirmed, if 
only weakly, by their subsequent analysis; the small number of minority holdings rendered statistical 
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associations weak.  The orientation towards the international centre was reflected in the composition 
of Boards of Management and Supervisory Boards; for example, the Hungarian company Magyar 
Telekom was majority controlled by Deutsche Telekom, with 59.2 per cent of voting shares; the Board 
of Directors (Management Board) was drawn primarily from the German corporate world, rather than 
Hungary, although the Supervisory Board was primarily Hungarian.
Multinationals had few incentives to maintain minority holdings in CEE companies, because of the 
fragile legal protection available to minority shareholders.  In Jindra’s survey of 425 CEE multinational 
subsidiaries, only 16 per cent of companies sampled in Hungary and 16 per cent in Poland had 
minority (10-50 per cent) foreign participation (Jindra, 2007).  Mannix et al (2004:20) found that a 
similar small proportion, only 14.5 per cent of subsidiaries, had minority participation in their study of 
manufacturing subsidiaries in Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.  Minority shareholders 
faced the danger of exploitation by majority block holders, with limited legal protection (Pistor, 2000: 
5, 10-12).  The benefits of minority participation were the opportunities for organizational learning 
and the establishment of an informed bridgehead for subsequently securing control.  For example, the 
Austrian oil company OMV used its 21 per cent holding in the Hungarian company MOL as a launch 
pad for securing control of the company in 2008; when the bid was unsuccessful the company sold 
its holding to the Russian oil company Surgutneftegas.  The Russian company declared immediately 
that it would not use the holding as the basis for seeking control, but proved unable to exercise even its 
minority participation rights at subsequent AGMs (Martin, 2010: 159-60).  The Russian shareholding 
was eventually bought by the Hungarian government in 2011, after extended negotiations.  Minority 
participation by the multinational was associated with greater autonomy for the subsidiary, even after 
taking account of country of origin, industry and firm size (Mannix et al.,2004: 44).
Under joint venture arrangements, multinational management shared corporate control with local 
investors, reducing risks at the cost of sharing control.  During the early stages of the transition period, 
joint ventures facilitated market access, provided a means for organizational learning, when detailed 
knowledge of CEE enterprises was limited, as well as containing risks and avoiding accusations of 
foreign exploitation – the acceptable face of foreign ownership.  However, multinationals regarded joint 
ventures as a transitional organizational form, with the problems of shared control and organizational 
difficulties outweighing the benefits of reduced risks and organizational learning.  Where joint ventures 
succeeded, there was a strong incentive for multinationals, as the financially more secure partners, to 
buy out junior partners, especially once the multinational had acquired local knowledge, and the local 
market had developed commercial support services initially provided by the local partner.  Where 
joint ventures failed, but the multinational believed that the market had potential, there was also a 
strong incentive for the multinational to buy out the other partner.  Joint ventures therefore often 
evolved into multinational controlled enterprises, with the multinational providing major financial 
resources, management skills, and technology, as well as international connections.  In the motor 
industry, foreign ownership shares in joint ventures increased throughout the 1990s, with only FIAT 
and Daewoo retaining significant local investment, largely because of the financial difficulties of the 
foreign owners (Radosevic and Rozeik, 2005:34).  For Hungary, joint ventures, often founded out of 
privatized state enterprises, came increasingly under multinational control (Stark and Vedres, 2006: 
1380).  The Budapest Stock Exchange itself progressed from being a joint venture to being majority 
owned by Austrians.
The third feature was the mode of acquisition of the subsidiary, whether during the privatization 
process, post privatization or by green-field development.  The degree of autonomy available to the 
subsidiary may be expected to be greater where subsidiaries were acquired through privatization, 
possibly after a period of initial conflict, because of organizational history and culture.  Subsidiaries 
acquired on privatization possessed their own initial organizational culture, embedded in managerial 
expectations and employee attitudes.  Where corporate management controlled the privatization 
process, their influence on corporate culture was likely to survive changes in ownership; even where 
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the process of privatization was controlled by state authorities, as in Hungary by the Hungarian State 
Property Agency, existing management groups exercised major influence on the privatization process 
(Antal- Mokos, 1998).  Pre-existing organizational cultures influenced the post socialist operations 
of the enterprise, even where new international owners wished to transform them, as Roney’s (2000) 
anthropological study of a Polish locking mechanism company dramatically demonstrated.  Direct 
acquisition by multinationals in the privatization process was more common in Hungary than elsewhere, 
due to the government’s policy of privatization by sale, preferably to strategic investors.  Multinationals 
had greater opportunities to undertake due diligence investigations on post privatization acquisitions 
than on privatization acquisitions, with more information on which to make judgments, especially 
through staged acquisitions, with initial involvement via minority participation.  With green-field 
developments, the influence of multinational headquarters was greater and the degree of subsidiary 
autonomy less, institutionally and culturally.  Green-field developments became increasingly common 
as the transformation progressed.
There were thus several factors which inclined multinationals to stand as ‘cathedrals in the 
desert’.  Multinational attention was focused on international strategy and its implementation, and the 
management of interdependencies within the corporation.  Both cost leadership and differentiation 
required central coordination.  Some multinationals followed multi-domestic internationalization 
strategies, some global internationalization strategies, and some trans-national strategies.  There were 
major differences between sectors, with especially limited autonomy in motor vehicles and electronics. 
The degree of autonomy granted to subsidiaries influenced the relations between multinationals and 
national business systems.  The degree of autonomy was influenced by the country of origin, the 
ownership structure, and the mode of acquisition, as well as the patterns of interdependence built into 
the production system, itself influenced by product markets and the sector’s technology.
The overall strategic and organizational logic adopted by multinationals thus suggests a ‘cathedrals 
in the desert’ approach to engagement, with subsidiaries incorporated into internationally oriented 
structures and systems.  Strategies, structures and modes of operation were centripetal.  In this scenario, 
the influence of national governments was very limited, with little leverage over multinationals (Doz, 
1986: 247).  Yet this exaggerates the multinational’s capacity for isolation from national environments. 
National governments determined initial access for acquiring ownership, through legislation and 
administrative procedures.  Institutional arrangements, including the legal framework, education and 
training systems, skill levels of the labor force, and infrastructure provision directly affected operational 
and corporate performance.  The predictability of government policies on taxation, and consistency 
in administrative application, were also important.  Features of the national business culture, such as 
norms of commercial trust, as well as material inputs required from local supply chains, also affected 
subsidiary performance.  Moreover, multinationals operating in regulated environments, such as 
telecommunications, or in strategically sensitive sectors, such as energy, including oil and gas, were 
necessarily involved at government levels with national business systems.  It is therefore necessary to 
examine the relations between multinationals and national business systems from the national as well 
as the MNC perspective.
3 .  N a t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  s y s t em s  an d  mu l t i n a t i o n a l s
The national business system here refers to the state, enterprise owners, managers, employees and 
associated institutions, policies and practices.  It is impossible to cover all elements in the space available 
here.  Instead, the section is divided into three parts.  The first part concerns the role of the state, insofar 
as it is related directly and indirectly to the interests of multinationals: legislation, state administration, 
taxation, institution  building and infrastructural development.  The second part examines the macro-
level business system, especially the degree of business system integration, at the sector, enterprise and 
individual plant levels.  The third part briefly discusses the cultural dimensions of national business 
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systems, and the relationship between national cultures and multinational organizational cultures.  The 
individual nation state, its culture, institutions, structure and the expectations of its citizens provided 
the frame for the perspective of the national business system.
Liberalization was an integral part of the post socialist transformation.  International financial 
institutions and the broader Washington consensus expected CEE countries to open their economies 
to foreign investment and to foreign ownership, as well as to remove barriers to the import of goods 
and services.  The Hungarian government committed itself to openness, as a signal of its incorporation 
into the international economic order as a ‘normal’ country, as well as a means of building an economy 
capable of supporting Western standards of living.  Hungary’s signature of a Europe Agreement in 
1991 with the EU institutionalized the acceptance of international norms of marketization, alongside 
political democracy.  The criteria for EU membership subsequently enshrined in the acquis communitaire 
included the free movement of capital as well as goods and persons, and the creation of a functioning 
market economy capable of withstanding international competition.  Hungary, as the other Visegrad 
states, signed IMF Article VIII, requiring the liberalization of financial capital flows (Bandelj, 2008:80). 
Governments created specialized agencies to encourage and facilitate foreign direct investment.
3.1. The state and multinationals
The state directly determined by legislation the conditions under which multinationals could acquire 
economic assets.  In Hungary, as in Poland, foreign participation in joint ventures was permitted 
from the 1980s, and foreign ownership from January 1989.  The Hungarian 1988 Act on Foreign 
Investments allowed foreign investors to set up businesses without special permission, except for 
banking and financial services, and to repatriate their profits.  Joint ventures with 30 per cent or more 
foreign participation were entitled to taxation privileges (Antal-Mokos, 1998: 45).  The 1988 Polish 
Joint Ventures Act granted special taxation privileges to foreign companies.  The 1991 Law on Foreign 
Investment, which replaced the 1988 Act, permitted foreign owned businesses to be established without 
special permission, except in a limited number of areas.  To avoid evasion of the restrictions through 
the creation of Polish front companies, domestic companies under foreign managerial or operational 
control were required to seek permits (Frydman et al., 1993: 166-8).  Foreign ownership was permitted 
in Czechoslovakia from 1991 and in Romania from the same year.  Hungary permitted multinationals 
to acquire corporate property, including physical assets (buildings, plant, and machinery), from early 
in the transition process, through participation in privatizations, by direct purchase or by green field 
development.  But there were restrictions on the ownership of land, especially agricultural land, which 
lasted until after EU accession.
Despite the universal international pressure for opening access to international investment, 
privatization legislation differed between countries, being more favorable to foreign investors in Hungary 
than elsewhere.  Hungary provided greater clarity in ownership rights and greater security of tenure, and 
allowed less scope for special privileges for managers, employees and, via voucher schemes, for citizens 
(for fuller discussion, see Hanley et al., 2002).  Polish privatization legislation provided for allocation of 
shares to employees and managers, at subsidized prices, and vouchers to citizens, as well as direct sale. 
The Czech privatization process through vouchers excluded participation by non-citizens, directly or 
indirectly.  Multinationals were not well placed for acquiring ownership of assets in the Czech Republic 
until the late 1990s, through purchase from investment trusts in a second privatization cycle.  Even 
in Hungary, the process of negotiating acquisitions was complex, and in the 1992-4 period the State 
Property Agency’s enthusiasm for foreign sales waned due to political pressure on the Antall government.
The state continued to influence the overall corporate structure of the economy.  Under socialism, 
the state and collective ownership arrangements bound governments and enterprises together.  Even 
after the state planning system of the classic Stalinist period had weakened, with the New Economic 
Mechanism in Hungary, institutional and financial ties bound governments and enterprises together 
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– not least through financial subsidies and soft budget constraints (Bartlett, 1998: ch.1).  Long term 
multinational participation in national business systems required the dissolution of this intimate 
connection, and the redefinition of the role of the state from that of active participant and particularistic 
decision maker to that of rule creator and enforcer of universal principles.  The dissolution of the ties 
was a staged process, following different timetables in different countries.  The first stage involved the 
transfer of decision making responsibilities from state bureaucracies to semi-independent industrial 
associations or to enterprises, a process that began with different versions of reform socialism and 
continued during the disintegration of socialist governments in 1989.  The second stage involved 
the ‘corporatization’ of enterprises, changes in their ownership arrangements, involving the state 
in transferring operational autonomy to the enterprise, within the framework of continuing state 
ownership, with an arms length relationship between the state and the enterprise.  The third stage 
involved the transfer of the majority of the state’s ownership rights to non-governmental owners, in 
varying proportions: to other state organizations such as municipal authorities, and to managers, 
employees, citizens as voucher holders, investment trust funds, banks, private nationals and foreign 
investors.  The state retained minority holdings.  The final stage involved the full transfer of ownership 
rights (control, usufruct and transfer) from the state to private ownership.  This process of ownership 
change began during the socialist period in Hungary, as in Poland, and continued in the post socialist 
period.  By 2010 the process had been largely completed; however, State Treasuries continued to hold 
shares in ‘privately owned’ enterprises.
The second aspect of state relations with multinationals was through government administrative 
procedures.  CEE remained a region of stamped papers, with permissions required for numerous business 
activities, ranging from property development to expatriate residence.  According to the World Bank 
rankings, in 2011 Hungary ranked 41st in all economies in ease of doing business (World Bank Group, 
2011).  Opening a business was easy, achievable in four days, ranking Hungary 35th.  However, there were 
major problems in investor protection (rank 120), paying taxes (rank 109) and trading across borders 
(rank 72).  The level of arbitrary government action differed between countries, with Hungary receiving 
much less criticism from the European Commission for arbitrary decision making than, for example, 
Romania.  Corruption was the most arbitrary form of state administrative action, the need to provide 
private financial incentives to secure state action.  Perceptions of corruption were widespread, and CEE 
states were amongst the most corrupt in Europe.  Based on the BEEPS 1999 survey, Steves and Rousso 
(2003: 14) showed that Hungary scored 1.5 out of 6 on a scale of ‘bribe tax’, compared with 2.5 for the 
Czech Republic and 1 for Poland; Hungary had the lowest score on the State Capture Index, measuring 
firms’ influence over the state.  In 2008, Hungary ranked 47th in Transparency International’s index of 
corruption, more corrupt than Poland but less corrupt than the Czech Republic and Romania.  Public 
procurement was a particular area of concern.  Press reports of corruption in public transport tenders, 
in property sales and approvals for development, in public sector appointments, were commonplace. 
In Poland, Johnson et al. (1999) found that 20.1 per cent of managers reported making extra-legal 
payments for government services, 19.3 per cent extra payments for licenses, although only 0.4 per cent 
reported making unofficial payments for on-going registration, 2.8 per cent for fire/sanitary inspection 
and 0.8 per cent for tax inspection.  Popular perceptions of corruption in Hungary, as in Poland, were 
more extensive than these figures suggest.  Corruption was thus a minority problem, more severe in some 
countries than in others, if less severe in Central and Eastern Europe than in Russia and the CIS.  More 
generally, the rigidity and complexity of bureaucratic procedures and the frequency of organizational 
and administrative changes, posed difficulties for both local and multinational enterprises; but the 
difficulties were greater for multinationals unfamiliar with the systems.  Getting the document to the 
top of the pile was as great a problem as the partiality of the decision.
The third issue was taxation.  Taxation systems were opaque, arbitrary and subject to frequent 
changes.  Taxation issues proved a major problem for multinationals operating in Russia, but proved 
considerably less so for multinationals operating in Central and Eastern Europe.  Rates of corporate 
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taxation were not high, by West European standards, with 34 per cent the highest rate of corporation 
tax and 18 per cent in Slovakia, although employee on-costs were high.  Moreover, multinationals 
were able to manage their tax obligations through intra-company financial transfers.  Corporate taxes 
were substantially lower than personal taxes, encouraging citizens to establish micro-companies as a 
means of reducing tax liabilities.  The personal tax liabilities of expatriate staff were often subject to the 
country of employment contract, not the country of multinational operations.
The fourth aspect of the business system was the overall governmental institutional structure.  The rule 
of law was fundamental to the operation of the business system.  This had two dimensions: the provisions 
of the law, and the institutional structures that supported legal processes.  Law was especially important 
during economic transformation because it created rights and responsibilities where established definitions 
and understandings were absent.  Law provided decision rules, and thus a basis for management decision-
making.  It also played a wider educational role, indicating the behaviors required for market competition. 
The interaction between law and corporate structures went beyond formal provisions.  For example, 
the protection of the legal rights and responsibilities of shareholders, especially minority shareholders, 
proved problematic and directly influenced the preferences of potential investors: weak protection for 
minority shareholders led to insistence on controlling shareholders to prevent exploitation (Pistor, 2000). 
Comparative legal analysis suggested that the Anglo-Saxon law family provided the strongest protection 
for investor interests (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999).  However, Hungary belonged to the 
German legal family, as Poland and the Czech Republic; no CEE country belonged to the Anglo Saxon 
common law family.  However, the legislation regarding the basic features of corporate structure and 
commerce was similar to international provisions, because of the strong influence of international technical 
assistance and the requirements for EU accession (Pistor, 2000).  Hungarian corporate legislation showed 
greater sympathy for stakeholder conceptions of the firm, with two-tier corporate governance structures, 
including employee representation on supervisory boards, than for the investor dominated conceptions 
of the firm of liberal market capitalism – although the 2006 Companies Act provided less support for 
employee representation than the preceding 1997 legislation.
A second aspect of state institutional arrangements was the educational system.  The availability of 
an educated labor force was a major attraction to multinationals, and depended upon state policies and 
levels of investment.  Primary and secondary education was well developed, and levels of literacy and 
numeracy were high, as indicated in the UN Human Development Index.  During the socialist period, 
the responsibility for skills training was shared between enterprises and local training institutions. 
However, such arrangements collapsed during the post socialist period; the balance between public 
and private responsibility for developing skills changed, with a decline in state provision and increased 
responsibility placed on the private individual as well as the enterprise.  Because of financial difficulties, 
the state was unable to maintain previous levels of expenditure in the early years after 1989.  However, by 
the 2000s levels of expenditure on education as a proportion of GDP matched west European standards; 
in 2008 Hungary spent 5.2 per cent of GDP on education, compared with an average of 5.0 per cent 
for the EU 27 (Eurostat, 2010).  The proportion of the 15-24 age group in education was 64.5 per cent 
in Hungary, compared with 59.7 per cent for the EU 27.  The high levels of investment in education 
and technical training during the socialist period provided a high level of competence amongst the 
first generation of new post socialist employees.  However, this cultural capital was gradually depleted, 
and multinationals themselves were required increasingly to assume responsibility for maintaining 
and enhancing skill levels.  Tertiary education remained largely separate from multinational concerns, 
except for specialized professional and technical areas such as medicine.  Management students usually 
paid their own fees to undertake MBA programs, although the EBRD provided limited financial 
assistance through funding loans.
Tensions between multinationals and governments were brought into sharp focus by the experience 
of the Orban government in Hungary in 2010.  To deal with the effects of the financial crisis and 
recession, the Orban government imposed crisis levies on banks and major corporations in the energy, 
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telecommunications and supermarket sectors, the majority of whom were multinationals, as well as 
introducing major changes to pension arrangements.  The measures were popular with the electorate, 
since they appeared to provide a means for controlling public sector deficits whilst avoiding tax rises.  But 
the measures were highly unpopular with multinationals and incurred strong international criticism, 
with complaints by multinational corporations that the measures infringed basic EU rules, and threats 
of potential reductions in international investment in Hungary: the stand-off is currently unresolved 
(January 2011).
3.2. National business systems
National business systems comprised the formal institutions and structures, the patterns of behavior 
and the norms and values institutionalized in capitalist economic systems.  Business systems are 
conceptualized here as the distribution of economic actors in a four dimensional space, by the 
relationships amongst the dimensions that create meaningful segments, and by relations between 
the segments.  The following four elements define the segments: (1) property ownership; (2) access 
to capital; (3) relation to local, national and international production systems and product markets; 
and (4) relations between the state and the economy.  To simplify, the categories of ownership are 
private, collective or state.  The modes of capital accumulation are individual/market, bank, or state 
budget.  Relations with the market are open market, networked, or chartered monopoly.  The state 
may be clearly differentiated from the economy or may be closely linked.  Schematically, national 
business systems may be characterized by: (1) the greater or lesser private ownership of property, 
including productive assets; (2) greater or lesser access to capital, and via different channels; (3) 
greater or lesser integration into local, national and international production systems and product 
markets; and (4) greater or lesser differentiation between state and economy.  Three integrated business 
systems are suggested.  In Model 1 (liberal market capitalism), the business system is based upon the 
private ownership of productive assets, open access to capital resources via market relations (credit, 
borrowing, issuance of equity) and competitive relations in product markets, whether intermediary or 
final consumer markets.  There is a high degree of differentiation between the state and the economy. 
In Model 2 (coordinated market capitalism), there is collective property ownership and control, access 
to finance via banks and other forms of relational financing and market linkages through networks. 
The state encourages the development of corporatist relations between state and economic actors.  In 
the third model, Model 3 (socialism), the state is property owner, with capital resources raised through 
taxation and other forms of public revenue, and with market access based on chartered monopoly 
arrangements.  The state dominates the economy.  However, not all business systems are so neatly 
arranged; business systems may be ‘mixed’, with the four dimensions less coherently tied with each 
other and with different segments operating on different principles.
In contrast to the hypothesized models, post socialist national business systems were characterized 
by low levels of integration between segments of the economy defined in terms of the four dimensions, 
with different segments of the system operating according to different business logics.  The four 
segments that were created in Hungary were the state segment, the privatized segment, the de novo 
segment and the international segment.  Multinationals therefore had to orient themselves to several 
segments, including other members of their own international segment.
3.2.1. Hungary’s segmented business system
Hungary represented the most liberal market form of post socialist capitalism in CEE.  Hungary may 
thus be expected to form an integrated, Model One, business system, based on the principles of liberal 
market capitalism.  For many Hungarians, the accession to the EU in 2004 represented the end of 
M U L T I N A T I O N A L  C O R P O R A T I O N S  A N D  N A T I O N A L  B U S I N E S S  S Y S T E M S :  I N T E G R A T I O N  O R  S E P A R A T I O N
25
the post socialist transition and the emergence of Hungary as a fully fledged capitalist economy; ‘the 
accession of ten East European countries to the European Union in 2004 decisively closed a chapter in 
history, opened in 1989’ (Vedres, 2004:1).  However, the form of business system established in post 
socialist Hungary was less straightforward than this judgment suggests.  In the early 1990s, the political, 
economic and social transformation following the collapse of the socialist regime in Hungary created 
four politico-economic segments, characterized by different combinations of the four dimensions of 
property ownership, access to capital, production and market relationships and the role of the state.
The first was the state segment.  Previously dominant, at least in form, the state divested activities, 
decentralized and changed shape, to reflect its new role of democratized legislator, administrator, service 
provider, limited strategic investor and residual legatee for ailing enterprises.  The state provided the 
legislative, administrative and judicial foundation for economic activities, as well as direct management 
of the limited range of economic resources that remained in state ownership.  Alongside its legislative 
and administrative role, the state retained ownership of some productive assets, with increased 
bureaucratic autonomy following the elimination of the Communist Party.  The segment continued 
to rely primarily on the state budget for finance.  It had limited links with international production 
systems, but the state retained importance for overall market relations via its regulatory role, for 
example in telecommunications.  The second segment comprised previously state owned enterprises 
whose assets were ‘recombined’ through privatization (Stark, 1996).  The segment was characterized by 
complex, fluid property arrangements, involving combinations of different forms of public and private 
ownership.  The segment had access to a wide range of sources of finance, domestic and international. 
The segment was oriented to both domestic and international production systems.  The institutional 
fluidity of the privatized sector meant that the segment remained linked to the state and politicized, 
since decisions on property allocation and institutional arrangements continued to be political as well 
as economic (Antal-Mokos, 1998).  The third segment comprised de novo firms, newly established small 
and medium sized private firms.  Ownership was private, usually personal rather than institutional, 
access to external finance was limited and the business orientation was primarily to domestic markets. 
The fourth segment comprised the multinationals themselves, the international business segment. 
Property ownership was private, usually institutional or corporate, with ready access to varied sources 
of finance, domestic and foreign, and primarily oriented to international markets.
In the early 1990s, the four segments identified occupied different locations in the four dimensional 
space.  State firms were in national or local government ownership, with financial resources acquired 
from the state budget, and operating under chartered monopoly, although threatened by multinational 
competition in some sectors.  The second segment, privatized firms, was in state/collective ownership, 
financed from the state budget or from relational bank financing, and networked relations with 
national and international production systems.  The third segment, de novo firms, was under private 
ownership, with capital internally generated or acquired from relations and friends and open market 
relations with primarily local and national product markets.  The fourth segment, multinational 
corporations (operating as joint ventures or as wholly owned subsidiaries), were privately owned, 
financed through internal transfer, and were related to product markets via intra-firm linkages, 
leading to the open market.  The following paragraphs outline the international segment in terms of 
the four dimensions. 
Ownership By 2001, the majority of the top 200 Hungarian firms were either foreign owned and 
operated independently (29 per cent) or with substantial foreign participation and operating as members 
of an ownership network including indigenous firms (26 per cent) (Stark and Vedres, 2005:13).  By 
2002 80 per cent of investment in the Hungarian economy was contributed by foreign companies, and 
82 per cent of exports.  The major owners were German, with Deutsche Telecom as the single largest 
foreign investor, but with RWE Energie/Energie Baden Wurtenburg in electricity, Bayernwerk AG also 
in electricity and Volkswagen/Audi in car manufacturing.  US companies were also major owners, with 
General Electric in lighting, General Motors in car manufacturing and US West in cellular phones. 
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A small number of regional multinationals firms were jointly owned by Hungarian and international 
investors, including MOL in oil and gas and OTP in banking and financial services.
Finance The major source of finance for the international segment was by intra company transfer 
from foreign owners.  Foreign owned firms also had greater access to external finance, including easier 
access to credit, both domestically and internationally.  Annual inward investment into Hungary 
between 1996 and 2001 stood at $2275m in 1996, dropping to $1649m in 2000, before rising to 
$2443m in 2001.  By 2007 Hungary’s FDI stock had reached 70.5 per cent of GDP (UNCTAD, 2008: 
Annex B, Table B3).  In the early years of the transition the FDI was in the form of equity investment. 
However, from 1996 investment was increasingly in the form of intra-company loans. Such loans 
increased from 21.41 per cent of FDI flow in 1996 to 55.89 per cent of FDI flow in 2001 (National 
Bank of Hungary [2003] Table 3a).  Intra-company loans also represented an increasing share of the 
stock of foreign investment, increasing from 11.09 per cent in 1996 to 19.17 per cent in 2001.  In 
addition, an increasing share of investment was financed by reinvested earnings, with 9.48 per cent 
of the FDI flow in 2008 arising from reinvested earnings (MNB, 2010, Statistics, FDI).  Increasing 
foreign capital investment accentuated the differential between foreign and indigenous firms.  Hence, 
foreign owned corporations increased their share of the ownership of gross assets in manufacturing 
from 29.2 per cent in 1992 to 77.2 per cent in 1999, and share of investment from 42.5 per cent in 1992 
to 84.7 per cent in 1999 (Hamar, 2002:34).
Market relations Multinationals were Hungary’s means of integration into global production 
systems.  Integrated into international production systems, with higher levels of investment, higher 
levels of profits, and greater access to capital the foreign owned segment of Hungarian enterprise 
provided the basis for the possible development of a dual economy in Hungary.  The major contributors 
to Hungarian exports – and imports – were wholly or partially foreign owned corporations (Hamar, 
2002).  In 1999, 17.7 per cent of manufacturing companies were foreign owned, but they contributed 
88.7 per cent of net income from manufacturing exports.  Exports represented 59.5 per cent of the 
output of foreign owned firms.  In contrast, the remaining 82.3 per cent of indigenously owned 
manufacturing firms exported only 11.3 per cent of their output, representing 20.7 per cent of exports 
(ibid.:34-5).  The composition of Hungarian international exports changed from products in which the 
country’s firms had specific historic comparative advantages (including agricultural products) to higher 
value added products characteristic of industrialized economies, most importantly office machinery, 
engineering products and motor vehicles.  The international segment was also responsible for a high 
level of imports, amounting to HUF 6928.1 billions in 2000 (Hungarian CSO, 2003).
There was a sharp contrast between foreign owned and indigenous owned manufacturing firms. 
Foreign owned firms were heavily oriented towards exports, whilst indigenous firms were oriented 
to the domestic market.  Hence, foreign owned firms contributed 58.3 per cent of the net income of 
domestic sales, compared with 88.7 per cent of the manufacturing sector’s net income on export sales. 
The contrast between export oriented foreign owned firms and domestically oriented indigenous firms 
is even stronger when the service sector is taken into account, since the service sector was predominantly 
locally owned and oriented to local products and services (Major, 2003), with the important exception 
of financial services.  The international segment’s market relations contrasted sharply with the market 
linkages of de novo firms.
3.3. Economic culture
Economic culture refers broadly to the norms and values governing economic activity, both inside the 
corporation and in external market relations.  It includes notions of fairness, honesty, transparency, as 
well as conceptions of exploitation.  Economic culture refers both to national and to organizational 
cultures.  Market institutions and market relations are strengthened by consensus on basic concepts 
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of economic culture, or at least by explicit recognition of differences.  The economic cultures of 
western multinationals differ, reflecting their national origins, with major differences between, for 
example, British, German and French multinationals (Lane, 1989).  Nevertheless, they pre-suppose a 
limited range of norms and values – internally, acceptance of corporate authority relations, externally, 
transparency and hostility to corruption.  Such operating assumptions coexist with national cultural 
differences, such as those identified by Hofstede (1994).  Arrangements for corporate governance are 
based on such norms, as the necessary foundation for economic exchange.  The arrangements may be 
enshrined in contract, backed by legal sanctions, or incorporated in understandings, enforced by group 
sanctions, as norms of reciprocity in Chinese guanxi relationships.  Further values, for example the 
positive evaluation of risk taking and innovation may be fostered in entrepreneurial firms, as in some 
national cultures.  Internal norms and values are explicitly developed in company training programs – 
‘the GE way’, ‘the IBM way’, ‘the Sony way’.  Of course, norms and values do not always govern actions, 
but they are recognized if neglected; misbehavior is only possible with norms of behavior (Ackroyd and 
Thompson, 1999).
Historically, the economic cultures of CEE were different.  Nineteenth century economies were 
dominated by state bureaucracies and landed aristocracies, with capitalist enterprises developed by non-
indigenous populations, mainly Jewish or German (Berend, 1998).  The largest group of indigenous 
workers were peasants, combining subsistence small holdings with external agricultural employment. 
Post World War Two industrialization in Hungary, as in Poland and Romania, resulted in rural 
migration to urban areas, with urban dwellers continuing to maintain links with their villages of 
origin.  Norms and values centered on family and kinship, with distrust of formal institutions (Rose, 
2009).  Socialist ideology imposed the very different norms and values of Party loyalty and group 
commitment on top of family centered norms and values, rather than transforming them: Lampland’s 
(1995) study of the Hungarian village indicates the interplay between economic changes and social 
value under socialism.  Familism and individualism were combined with formalized conformity with 
group values, as in ‘painting socialism’ (Burawoy and Lukacs, 1994:20-21).  Beyond the family, within 
society, the Party and working class movement, within the enterprise, the work group, were the foci 
of commitment.  The development of capitalist economic relations destroyed the formal collectivism, 
fostering competitive individualism.  Such competitive individualism complemented the mistrust 
of formal institutions, especially political parties, revealed in successive Eurostat and New Europe 
Barometer surveys (e.g., Rose, 2009: 154), and the widespread perceptions of corruption revealed in 
Transparency International surveys .  Within the enterprise, the culture of competitive individualism 
encouraged low trust relationships between management and employees, with many managers 
perceiving employees as opportunistic and lacking organizational commitment.  Overall, the economic 
culture – at best - encouraged entrepreneurship, risk taking and sophisticated market relationships, but 
discouraged long term institution building and productive collaborative relationships.
In view of the contrast between the formal requirements of multinational economic culture 
and the national culture, multinationals sought to build their own organizational cultures.  This 
involved selective recruitment, including a preference for ‘international Hungarians’, nationals with 
international experience, especially where technological change required adaptability, initiative and 
cross functional flexibility.  Developing organizational culture also involved establishing formal human 
resource development programs, to develop cultural skills as well as functional skills, especially at 
managerial level.  Hence, GE Lighting implemented its Seven Sigma program throughout Hungary, as 
in other parts of the GE Corporation.  Multinationals’ focus on fostering their own corporate working 
cultures reinforced the cultural distance between multinationals and locally owned enterprises.  This 
distance was further sustained by the low turnover in multinational employees, with higher earnings 
underpinning organizational commitment.
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4 .  C on c l u s i o n:  mu l t i n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  an d  n a t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  s y s t em s
This paper has examined the relations between multinationals and national business systems, analyzing 
Hungary in a comparative context.  In Hungary, multinationals have contributed to international 
trade, to capital investment, to technological innovation, to the import of new management techniques, 
to broadening international awareness, as well as being major employers.  In these respects the interests 
of multinationals and national governments coincided.  However, strategic decisions relating to the 
activities of multinationals were taken outside the region, at corporate headquarters, rather than within 
the region, and regional priorities remained subordinate to corporate priorities when conflicts between 
the two arose, for example over plant relocations.  The orientation of multinationals differed from 
that of other participants in the national business system, especially locally owned enterprises – their 
orientation is to their corporate headquarters, not to the national interests or institutions of the countries 
in which they are operating.  The corporate headquarters are responsive to the interests of corporate 
shareholders, as owners, as well as to the corporation’s institutional interests, including the institutional 
interests of higher management.  Multinationals follow strategies of cost leadership, differentiation, 
or focus, in relation to the dynamics of the product markets and production systems, technologies 
and institutions.  The strategies adopted have different implications for organizational structures, 
with different patterns of control, coordination, and configuration, with different implications for 
relations with national business systems.  Reflecting these considerations, multinational strategies and 
structures differ between sectors, with greater centralization in some sectors, such as motor vehicles 
and electronics, especially where corporations are following cost leadership strategies in serving mass 
markets, than in others, such as heavy engineering.  Such differences have direct implications for the 
degree of integration between multinationals and the national business system in which they operate. 
The greater the orientation to global strategies, the lower the level of discretion accorded to subsidiaries, 
the lower the incentive for subsidiaries to participate fully in national business system activity.
Multinational engagement was also influenced by features of the CEE environment.  Historically, 
CEE has been peripheral to a West European core.  In the Nineteenth Century the ‘sleeping east’ 
provided primarily agricultural products for the industrializing north west of Europe.  Since 1989, 
the region has been incorporated into the international economy at the level of international trade 
and at the level of international production systems.  The EU, especially Germany, has become the 
most important destination for exports and source of imports, as well as source of capital investment - 
although the relation between the EU and CEE is asymmetric, with EU exports to CEE representing 
approximately 2.5 per cent of EU exports, and CEE exports to the EU representing approximately 60 
per cent of CEE exports.  Moreover, the Hungarian national business system differed in three respects 
from West European business systems, which affected the capabilities of multinationals to integrate 
into national systems.  Firstly, the Hungarian business system showed a higher level of segmentation 
than, for example, the British or German systems, with higher levels of differentiation between the 
segments; the number of segments made engagement more difficult, and less rewarding.  Secondly, the 
influence of shareholders was lower, and the influence of corporate management was greater, resulting 
in differences in the realities of corporate governance practice; national managers had more room for 
maneuver and had fewer masters than their multinational counter-parts.  Thirdly, the state continued 
to have a broader influence upon the business system than in Western Europe, continuing to politicize 
economic life.
Multinationals and national business systems were bound together by interests and institutions, 
at three levels.  The first level was the national, governmental, level, and concerned the extent to 
which multinationals benefited from government policies and activities, both from general and from 
selective policies.  The second level was the collective, group level, and concerned the relations between 
multinationals and collective business and employer organizations: to what extent did multinationals 
share collective interests and institutions with other enterprises?  The third level concerned the relations 
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between multinationals and other enterprises, whether as customers or as suppliers.  At each level, 
multinationals and governments, groups and firms shared reciprocal but not identical interests, nor 
identical institutional engagements.
The first level concerned multinationals and the state.  Multinationals and the state were 
interdependent.  Multinationals required the state to provide a predictable institutional framework 
within which they could operate, to provide macro-economic stability (or at least to control macro 
economic risk) and to provide legitimacy for their activities.  The liberalization and expansion of 
international trade and government policies of deregulation in the late Twentieth Century paradoxically 
increased rather than reduced governmental and inter-governmental regulation, with privatizations 
leading to the need for external regulatory controls, including controls to prevent abuse of monopoly 
(Vogel, 1996).  In addition, governments were major customers for multinationals’ products, with 
public procurement practices a major multinational concern, for example over investment in transport 
infrastructure.  Governments depended upon multinationals for financial resources - taxes, customs 
and excise duties, payment of special levies: for example, the 2010 crisis tax on supermarket chains 
raised HUF 10.7bn from TESCO alone.  Governments also depended upon multinationals for capital 
investment in new technologies, for access to new social technologies and for access to international 
markets.  FDI was the mechanism for upgrading domestic industry and accelerating economic growth.
In the specific context of post socialist capitalisms, the balance of dependences between 
multinationals and national governments and business systems differed from Western Europe, with 
multinationals less dependent and national governments more dependent.  In terms of the first level of 
internationalization, the logic of exchange, the market opportunities provided by CEE were attractive 
to multinationals, but the attractions were not overwhelming.  Private incomes in the region were low, 
and demographic factors were less favorable than in India and China, with much larger, and much 
younger, rapidly growing populations.  Poland, with almost four times the population of Hungary, was 
the most important market for multinationals to access.  Once market access had been granted, and the 
liberalization of trade in goods and services institutionalized in commitments to international financial 
institutions and the EU, CEE became subject to the competitive norms of international trade, for both 
exports and imports.  In terms of the logic of production, multinationals had multiple potential sites 
for investment in production facilities, with investment in China, India and Russia offering greater 
access to natural resources and investment facilities, as well as larger markets.  The availability of 
well-educated, skilled workers, with manufacturing experience, as well as access and proximity to EU 
markets, provided some limited compensation for these disadvantages.
For CEE governments, with decayed industrial and social infrastructures, capital shortage, ageing 
and in some cases declining populations, limited employment opportunities, and expanding economic 
aspirations amongst citizens, securing multinational investment was a high priority.  This was reflected 
in investment incentives, in Hungary as elsewhere in the region (Meyer and Jensen, 2005: 135-43).  At 
the same time, electorates were sensitive to potential betrayal of national interests.  CEE countries shared 
features with other peripheral dependent economies, if with significantly greater political leverage, and 
higher citizens’ expectations.
The second level concerned relations between multinationals and collective organizations within 
the national business system, the extent to which multinationals shared interests with other enterprises 
and participated in joint institutions.  Collective interest representative organizations had an interest 
in securing multinational involvement in support for their representations, provided that the support 
was not at the expense of the interests of national enterprises.  However, multinationals shared 
common interests with other multinationals rather than with national enterprises, using more capital 
intensive production systems, serving international rather than local product markets, and following 
different labor relations policies.  This was reflected in multinationals establishing their own collective 
organization in Hungary, the Association of Multinational Companies, and adopting ad hoc pressure 
tactics when facing unfavorable government actions, as in 2010.  When the Orban government adopted 
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policies perceived as hostile by major multinationals in 2010, multinationals responded with an ad hoc 
grouping and pressure on the European Union, rather than proceeding through established Hungarian 
institutions.  However, common interests amongst multinationals were limited by market competition. 
The interests shared between multinationals and national enterprises were few.  Moreover, there 
were risks both for multinationals and collective employers’ organizations if multinationals played 
a prominent role in government lobbying activities, leading to accusations of surrendering national 
interests to foreigners.  One area of potential joint participation concerned the management of labor, 
through the National Interest Representation Council.  Employers’ representatives, trade unions and 
government representatives participated in tripartite partnership institutions, initially established 
in the early 1990s and given reinforced status by the EU, through its commitment to tripartite – 
government, employers and trade unions – partnership institutions.  The tripartite institutions were a 
means of building national consensus on economic and social issues, with labor accepting restrictions 
in exchange for consultation on political, economic and social issues.  However, multinationals played 
little part in such institutions, managing labor within their own corporate systems, although in a small 
number of cases national unions were involved at firm level.
The third level concerned relations between multinationals and individual firms.  In terms of 
the logic of exchange, multinationals were both suppliers to and customers for domestically owned 
enterprises, with their role as customers especially important, as a means of strengthening providers’ 
quality standards.  The majority of multinational sales were international.  For example, in Majcen et 
al.’s study (2006:13-14), overall exports accounted for 51.8 per cent of sales.  However, there were major 
differences between countries, with Poland, the largest economy, having by far the highest proportion 
of multinational domestic sales: 62.6 per cent domestic buyers, 20.8 per cent foreign parent company, 
12.0 per cent other foreign customers, and 4.5 per cent other domestic subsidiaries of foreign parents. 
Sales of subsidiaries in Hungary were split: 43.3 per cent to other domestic buyers, 27.7 per cent to 
foreign parent, 24.4 per cent to other foreign customers, and 3.5 per cent to other domestic subsidiaries 
of foreign parents.  Domestic firms were naturally apprehensive about multinationals as threatening 
competitors in domestic markets.
More important for developing relations with domestic business was the level of inputs purchased 
from domestic suppliers.  Multinationals had an interest in ensuring accessible, low cost inputs. 
Provided that quality standards were met, prices were competitive, and deliveries were reliable, there 
were major advantages in local rather than more distant sourcing.  Multinationals were sophisticated 
customers, and as such demanded high levels of performance from suppliers, since the inputs were 
to be incorporated into products badged with the multinationals’ brand.  Purchasing from domestic 
suppliers was a visible indication of multinational confidence in the quality of domestic products. 
In his study of the international competitive advantage of nations, Porter stressed the importance 
of sophisticated customers as a major source of product quality improvement, and as such a source 
of national competitive advantage (Porter, 1990).  In the Majcen study, multinationals in Hungary 
purchased more from suppliers than they sold to domestic customers, the split in purchases being 45.29 
per cent from other domestic suppliers, 32.03 per cent from other foreign suppliers, 17.88 per cent from 
foreign owners, and 1.18 per cent from other domestic subsidiaries of foreign owners.  For Poland, 
the proportions were 40.47 per cent from other domestic suppliers, 17.83 per cent from other foreign 
suppliers, 33.98 per cent from foreign owners, and 6.66 per cent from other domestic subsidiaries of 
foreign owners.
Multinationals’ purchasing practices provided a channel for transferring technology and 
management skills to domestic owned corporations.  Links between multinationals and suppliers 
provided a channel for spill over effects, with multinationals providing expertise in quality controls 
and other mean for enhancing the production capabilities of domestic corporations.  The likelihood 
of such spill over effects depended on both the incentives for the multinational and the absorptive 
capabilities of domestic firms.  Incentives for multinationals were high when the components from 
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suppliers formed a major part of the multinational subsidiaries’ products, whether destined for onward 
processing within the multinational or as products for final consumers.  For example, the elaborate 
quality control procedures established by the Japanese car assembler Suzuki helped to drive up the 
quality standards of the Hungarian car components firm RABA, to the benefit of both Suzuki and 
RABA, whose other customers, which included the Hungarian military, benefited from the upgrading. 
The multinational preference for local sourcing was especially strong when multinationals required 
high bulk and low value supplies.  The ability of domestic firms to learn from multinationals depended 
upon their own capacities, linked in turn to their own level of technological development; too low a 
level of technological development made absorption impossible, too advanced a level of technological 
development made the learning counter-productive.
The transfer of technological capabilities may be horizontal, from multinationals to domestic firms 
operating in the same sector, as well as vertical, through establishing quality standards and providing 
support for suppliers.  However, the potential for horizontal spill over was limited.  There were disincentives 
for multinationals to facilitate spill over for firms operating in their own markets.  Multinationals had 
an interest in restricting rather than enhancing the performance of other firms in the same sector, 
which might build up potential competitors.  Moreover, multinationals were naturally reluctant to 
contribute to the technological upgrading of firms which might plausibly become competitors.  At the 
same time, domestic firms may recruit employees with prior experience of working in multinationals, 
and have enhanced possibilities for reverse engineering multinational products.  Overall, econometric 
research suggests that horizontal spill over was limited.  Multinational involvement had the potential 
to enhance the performance of domestically owned firms, both as sophisticated customers and through 
direct collaboration.  However, the impact of multinationals upon national economic performance 
was less through the impact on the productivity of domestically owned corporations than through the 
direct impact of the higher productivity of the foreign owned subsidiaries themselves.
Multinationals played a major role in integrating national business systems into the international 
economy through the logic of exchange, with their contribution to the expansion of both imports and 
exports.  But the major role of multinationals in integrating national economies into the international 
economy was through the logic of production, with multinationals incorporating CEE enterprises 
into global production systems, both directly through the acquisition of enterprises and transforming 
them into multinational subsidiaries, and indirectly, as customers, providing a channel for domestic 
firms into international markets.  Multinationals were agents of internationalization, introducing new 
material and social technologies into national systems, and providing a conduit for national links to the 
international economy.  However, this integration did not signify globalization, i.e. the development of 
corporate strategies independently of the national origin, the national cultures, and the national interests 
of multinational owners.  Multinationals did not relocate their international headquarters, or, except 
in rare cases, their R&D facilities to CEE.  Multinational subsidiaries in CEE were subordinated to 
central corporate control, of their strategic development and their production capacity.  Regardless of the 
specific strategy adopted, and corporate structures established, multinationals operated on a centripetal 
basis, although the mechanisms whereby corporate headquarters exercised central control differed.
As a result of the post socialist transformation, CEE business systems comprised diverse segments, 
with different forms of ownership, sources of capital, links to international production systems and 
markets and relations with the state.  Multinationals became a further, international segment of 
national business systems.  The growth of multinationals accentuated the differentiation within the 
national business system that already existed.  But the internationalization did not transform national 
business systems either into models of liberal market capitalisms or coordinated market capitalisms. 
Instead, internationalization reinforced the divergent tendencies within national business systems, with 
different segments of the system sharing divergent interests.
Multinationals have transformed the Hungarian economy, and its relations with the international 
economy.  Hungarian enterprises, largely but not exclusively through acquisition by foreign owners, 
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have been integrated into the international economy through the logic of exchange, and through the 
logic of production.  This has had strongly positive consequences for the Hungarian economy, with 
Hungarian growth rates exceeding those of West European economies; in 2010 Hungary achieved a 
record surplus on its external physical trade balance, largely resulting from the export performance 
of multinationals.  Global recession increased pressure on multinational firms to priorities reducing 
production costs, favoring countries, such as Hungary, with relatively low labor costs, technologically 
competent labor, ease of access to west European markets, and adequate infrastructure.  The interests 
of multinationals and the Hungarian state are congruent with each other; but congruence differs 
from identity.  Multinationals, and their subsidiaries, have different orientations from national 
governments.  Multinationals respond to the interests of shareholders, interpreted by corporate boards, 
and of corporations as institutions.  Decisions on capital investment, on the distribution of resources to 
subsidiaries, on the allocation of subsidiary mandates and product responsibilities, are made in the light 
of those interests, and competition.  Corporate strategies and the structures established to realize them 
differ between corporations, in the light of their national institutions and cultures, and competitive 
pressures in different sectors and product markets.  Such factors account for the different approaches to 
operations in Hungary between the Volkswagen Group in motor vehicles, which massively expanded 
investment in Audi in Gyor, on the one hand, and GlaxoSmithKline in pharmaceuticals, which closed 
its regional headquarters in Budapest, on the other.
Globalization theorists suggest that the dynamics of competition are inevitably resulting in 
the dominance of multinational economic interests over national political interests.  However, this 
undervalues the continuing significance of national politics.  Successive Hungarian governments have 
encouraged multinational investment.  But government decisions respond to a wider range of pressures, 
especially from national electorates, and balance multinational concerns against unrelated priorities.  As 
the decisions of the Orban government indicate, those decisions may not always satisfy multinational 
interests, at least in the short run.
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